Black [Black, M., 1949, 'Language and Philosophy', Ithaca, p. 30] has given an excellent account of vagueness in the Peircian sense. [“A proposition (or any other symbol) is vague when there are possible states of things concerning which it is 'intrinsically uncertain' whether, had they been contemplated by the speaker, he would have regarded them as excluded or allowed by the proposition...” ]. Some vagueness is inherent in every sign, and the vagueness of different signs is not commensurable since vagueness is a pragmatic factor in denotation and hence beyond the province of semantics as the study of designation. Ambiguity, on the other hand, is a linguistic, semantic phenomenon arising from the presence of disjunctions in a designatum. These disjunctions are determinate results of the participation of a sign in more than one paradigm [...].
- Weinreich (1963), Pag. 143