[...] it appears more appropriate to use the word ‘sign’ as the name for the unit consisting of content-form and expression-form and established by the solidarity that we have called the sign function.
- Hjelmslev (1961), a pag.58

For the present we shall have to be content with the vague conception bequeathed by tradition. According to this conception a “sign” [...] is characterized first and foremost by being a sign ‘for’ something else – a peculiarity that [...] seems to indicate that a “sign” is defined by a function. A “sign” functions, designates, denotes; a “sign”, in contradiction to a non-sign, is the bearer of a meaning.
- Hjelmslev (1961), a pag.43

The sign is [...] a sign for a content-substance and a sign for an expression-substance. It is in this sense that the sign can be said to be a sign for something.
- Hjelmslev (1961), a pag.58

The sign is a two-sided entity, with a Janus-like perspective in two directions, and with effect in two respects: “outwards” toward the expression-substance and “inwards” toward the content-substance.
- Hjelmslev (1961), a pag.58