“Truth” in model theory is a relation between a sequence of meaningless symbols and a structure consisting of abstract entities and sets. If a relation of a specified kind holds between the sequence of symbols and the model structure, then the model is said to “satisfy” the symbol sequence, which is referred to as a “sentence”. That “sentence” is then called “true” in that model. [...]This use of the term “truth” has come to us from formalist mathematics. There is a very reasonable extension of the ordinary word “truth”. The reason is that both the symbols sequences and the model structures are taken as understood in terms of familiar mathematical concepts. When both the symbols sequences and the models are meaningful beforehand, then it make sense to use the ordinary English word “true” to speak of a satisfaction in a model. [...]But [...] such a prior understanding cannot be taken for granted in the case of ordinary natural language sentences. In the absence of any prior understanding of the sentences and the models that is justified in terms of research on cognition, it is more than a bit strange to use the word “true” to speak of sequences of meaningless symbols that are “satisfied” by a set-theoretical structure containing abstract entities and sets.
- Lakoff (1987), a pag.232

Truth relative to direct understanding can then be characterized as a correspondence between the understanding of the sentence and the understanding of the situation.
- Lakoff (1987), a pag.293

If a sentence is true, it is true by virtue of what it means and how it is understood. Truth depends on meaningfulness.We understand a statement as being true in a given situation if our understanding of the statement fits our understanding of the situation closely enough for our purposes.That is the basis of an experientialist account of truth. [...]Truth is relative to understanding. But we commonly take understanding to be an absolute. That is, we have a folk theory to the effect that:- There is one and only one correct way to understand reality. [...] This is our normal folk theory of truth. As with most folk theories, we can abandon it when forced to.[...] Such an account of truth also explains how metaphors can be true, since metaphors provide understandings of experiences.
- Lakoff (1987), a pag.294

Many of our most important truths are not physical truths, but truths that come about as a result of human beings acting in accord with a conceptual system that cannot in any sense be said to fit a reality completely outside of human experience. Human experience is, after all, real too-every bit as real as rocks and trees and cats and mats. Since we act in accord with our conceptual systems and since our actions are real, our conceptual systems have a major role in creating reality.
- Lakoff (1987), a pag.296

Categories of mind are often radially structured, with a central subcategory and extensions. I would like to suggest that the category of truths is similarly structured. Because [...] truth cannot be characterized simply as correspondence to a physical reality, we must recognize truth as a human concept, subject to the laws of human thought.[...] There are central and noncentral truths. The central truths are characterized in terms of directly understood concepts, concepts that fit the preconceptual structure of experience. Such concepts are (a) basic-level concepts in the physical domain and (b) general schemas emerging from experience.
- Lakoff (1987), a pag.296

The criterion of getting the truth conditions right in sentence-by-sentence translation ignores what is in the mind. It ignores how sentences are understood. And it ignores how concepts are organized, both internally and relative to one another.
- Lakoff (1987), a pag.316