In objectivist semantics, the truth conditions of the sentence depend on a preexisting metaphysical reality of the right kind.
- Lakoff (1987), a pag.186

The mechanisms of objectivist semantics would still not be able to account for human categorization. All that is available in set-theoretical models is structures made up of entities and sets. But human categories have richer structures [...] -radial structures, metaphorical structures, metonymic structures, and other kinds of structures that yield prototype effects. At the very least, much richer structures would have to be introduced. But this is not a trivial step. Objectivist semantics is supposed to be merely a matter of entities and sets. But now it would become much more: the models would need all kinds of structures that a general theory of cognitive models would have. [...] Objectivist semantics also makes assumptions about the nature of reference. It assumes that there is a unique and objectively correct way of assigning reference to entities in a formal language, that there is a mathematical function from symbols in the formal language to entities and sets in the models.
- Lakoff (1987), a pag.212

What objectivist semantics tries to do is use meaningless but structured models to give meaning to a meaningless but structured formal language.
- Lakoff (1987), a pag.234

Objectivist semantics, which takes a God’s eye point of view with respect to reference, truth, and meaning, is in essential conflict with humanly relevant semantics. The problem is how to eliminate the God’s eye point of view and make semantics humanly relevant, while preserving what is humanly relevant about logic and not giving in to total relativism.
- Lakoff (1987), a pag.247

Many of the consequences of objectivist semantics have simply been taken over wholesale into linguistics. For example, model-theoretic semantics presupposes that syntax is independent of semantics, and that semantics is independent of pragmatics (i.e., speech acts, implicatures, etc.). Those assumptions can no longer be made with impunity; [...] there is good reason to believe that they are false. [...] What have been called semantics and pragmatics are both structured using cognitive models, and [...] cognitive models have structure of the appropriate kind to provide a base for a theory of syntax.
- Lakoff (1987), a pag.256