The objectivist paradigm assumes that the meaning of the whole is a computable function of the meaning of the parts plus the syntactic relationship between the parts. This is simply wrong[...] The objectivist theories lack a concept of motivation. The meaning of the whole is often motivated by the meanings of the parts, but not predictable from them. What is required is a theory of motivation. Such a theory will be a cognitive theory and will go beyond any possible objectivist theory.
- Lakoff (1987), a pag.148

Objectivism [...] is one version of basic realism. Experientialism is another. Objectivism is a version that requires the classical theory of categories.
- Lakoff (1987), a pag.159

The objectivist paradigm can be broken down into two parts: 1. Metaphysics, or the nature of the world, independent of any human understanding 2. Epistemology, or the nature of human cognition, language and knowledge In brief, objectivism holds that reality is structured in a way that can be modeled by set-theoretical models; that is, the worlds consists of entities the properites of those entities the relations holding among those entities.
- Lakoff (1987), a pag.159

The objectivist claim that classical categories exist objectively in the external world is usually taken to be supported by biological evidence. Objectivist philosophers typically point to biological categories like tiger, crow, fish, zebra, etc., which they take as paradigm cases of natural kinds-classical categories that occur in nature and that are defined by essential necessary and sufficient conditions.
- Lakoff (1987), a pag.185

One of the cornerstones of the objectivist paradigm is the independence of metaphysics from epistemology. The world is as it is, independent of any concept, belief, or knowledge that people have. Minds, in other words, cannot create reality. I would suggest that this is false and that it is contradicted by just everything known in cultural anthropology. [...] In general extending objectivism to include institutional facts gets one into trouble with the assumption that metaphysics is independent of epistemology. The reason is that institutions are products of culture and hence products of human mind. They exist only by virtue of human minds.
- Lakoff (1987), a pag.207

Objectivity cannot be a matter of conforming to a God’s eye point of view, since the very existence of such a point of view is impossible on logical grounds. But that does not mean that there is no objectivity. Objectivity involves rising above prejudices, and that begins by being aware that we have those prejudices. The primal prejudice is our own conceptual system. To be objective, we must be aware that we have a particular conceptual system, we must know what it is like, and we must be able to entertain alternatives.
- Lakoff (1987), a pag.264

At the basic level of physical experience, many of the principles of objectivism appear to work well. Our intuitions that objectivism is “just common sense” seem to come from the preconceptual structure of our physical experience at that basic level. It is no accident that most of the examples used to justify objectivism come from this level of physical experience.
- Lakoff (1987), a pag.270

The existence of directly meaningful concepts-basic-level concepts and image-schemas provides certain fixed points in the objective evaluation of situations. The image-schematic structuring of bodily experience is, we hypothesize, the same for all human beings. Moreover, the principles determining basic-level structure are also universally valid
- Lakoff (1987), a pag.302