In model-theoretic semantics, the meaning of a sentence (the whole) is identified with its truth conditions in every possible situation. And the meaning of the terms (the parts) is identified with their referents in every possible situation. But truth underdetermines reference in model theory. Preserving the truth of sentences across models does not mean that the reference of the parts, while still preserving truth for the whole in every interpretation. But if sentence meaning is defined in terms of truth, and if the meaning of terms is defined in terms of reference, then one can change the “meaning” of the parts while preserving the “meaning” of the whole sentence.
- Lakoff (1987), a pag.235

Even under the situational account of meaning, it is possible to change the meaning of the parts without changing the meaning of the whole. [...] In short, defining meaning in terms of situations makes no difference, as long as situations are defined in terms of model theory, that is, in terms of models consisting only of entities and sets. The reason is that such models are themselves meaningless and yield the same results if replaced by isomorphic models. Thus, Putnam’s critique applies not merely to model-theoretic accounts where meaning is based on truth; it also applies to model-theoretic accounts of meaning which are based on situations [...]. The problem is not that truth conditions do not have enough structure. The problem is that structure is not enough to confer meaning.
- Lakoff (1987), a pag.251

A symbolic theory of meaning must also assign a meaning to whole sentences, or other symbolic structures, as well as to parts of those sentences or structures. If a symbolic theory is to be a theory of meaning, the meanings of the wholes cannot be kept the same when meanings of the parts change. Since a symbolic theory of meaning concerns only the association between symbols and things, any characteristics of any beings using the symbols must be irrelevant to the relationship between the meaning of the parts and the meaning of the wholes. In short, there must be an objective relations between the meaning of the parts and the meaning of the wholes, in which the meaning of the whole is dependent on the meanings of the parts. [...] The symbolic theory of meaning cannot be made precise in a consistent matter. In other words, meaning is not merely a matter of the association of symbols with things.
- Lakoff (1987), a pag.253

Experiential realism characterizes meaning in terms of embodiment, that is, in terms of our collective biological capacities and our physical and social experiences as beings functioning in our environment. At this point, we divide the problem into two parts: (1) structure and (2) the embodiment of that structure. Let us begin with structure. Our concepts are structured, both internally and relative to one another. That structuring permits us to reason, to comprehend, to acquire knowledge, and to communicate. The theory of cognitive models [...] is concerned with conceptual structure. But structure alone does not make for meaningfulness. We additionally need an account of what makes that structure meaningful. Experientialism claims that conceptual structure is meaningful because it is embodied, that is, it arises from, and is tied to, our preconceptual bodily experiences. In short, conceptual structure exists and is understood because preconceptual structures exist and are understood. Conceptual structure takes its form in part from the nature of preconceptual structures.
- Lakoff (1987), a pag.267

Meaning is not a thing; it involves what is meaningful to us. Nothing is meaningful in itself. Meaningfulness derives from the experience of functioning as a being of a certain sort in an environment of a certain sort. Basic-level concepts are meaningful to us because they are characterized by the way we perceive the overall shape of things in terms of part-whole structure and by the way we interact with things with our bodies. Image schemas are meaningful to us because they too structure our perceptions and bodily movements, though in a much less detailed way. Natural metaphorical concepts are meaningful because they are based on (a) directly meaningful concepts and (b) correlations in our experience. And superordinate and subordinate concepts are meaningful because they are grounded in basic-level concepts and extended on the basis of such things as function and purpose.
- Lakoff (1987), a pag.292

The meaning of the whole is often motivated by the meanings of the parts, but not predictable from them.
- Lakoff (1987), a pag.148