Experiential realism characterizes meaning in terms of embodiment, that is, in terms of our collective biological capacities and our physical and social experiences as beings functioning in our environment. At this point, we divide the problem into two parts: (1) structure and (2) the embodiment of that structure. Let us begin with structure. Our concepts are structured, both internally and relative to one another. That structuring permits us to reason, to comprehend, to acquire knowledge, and to communicate. The theory of cognitive models [...] is concerned with conceptual structure. But structure alone does not make for meaningfulness. We additionally need an account of what makes that structure meaningful. Experientialism claims that conceptual structure is meaningful because it is embodied, that is, it arises from, and is tied to, our preconceptual bodily experiences. In short, conceptual structure exists and is understood because preconceptual structures exist and are understood. Conceptual structure takes its form in part from the nature of preconceptual structures.
- Lakoff (1987), a pag.267