The Problem of Objectivist Cognition: Concept are not internal representations of external reality, since there is no corresponding external reality-there are no categories of the right kind of objectively “out there” for the concepts to mirror.
- Lakoff (1987), a pag.197

Our concepts are structured, both internally and relative to one another. That structuring permits us to reason, to comprehend, to acquire knowledge, and to communicate. The theory of cognitive models [...] is concerned with conceptual structure. But structure alone does not make for meaningfulness. We additionally need an account of what makes that structure meaningful. Experientialism claims that conceptual structure is meaningful because it is embodied, that is, it arises from, and is tied to, our preconceptual bodily experiences. In short, conceptual structure exists and is understood because preconceptual structures exist and are understood. Conceptual structure takes its form in part from the nature of preconceptual structures.
- Lakoff (1987), a pag.267

- Given basic-level and image-schematic concepts, it is possible to build up complex cognitive models. - Image schemas provide the structures used in those models.
- Lakoff (1987), a pag.282

In general, concepts are elements of cognitive models. Many concepts, for example, are characterized in terms of scenario ICMs. [...] For every such concept, there can be a corresponding category: those entities in a given domain of discourse that the concept (as characterized by the cognitive model) fits. If the concept is characterized in the model purely by necessary and sufficient conditions, the category will be classically defined. It can give rise to simple prototype effects if it is possible for entities in the domain of discourse to meet some background conditions of the model. It will give rise to metonymic prototype effects if the ICM contains a metonymic mapping from part of the category to the whole category. And if the concept is defined not by necessary and sufficient conditions but by a graded scale, then the resulting category will be a graded category.
- Lakoff (1987), a pag.286

Concepts that are fundamental, like space and time, are used in many other concepts throughout the system, while concepts like chutzpah and agape are localized to isolated domains of experience, and therefore don’t affect much else. [...] Fundamental concepts tend to be grammaticized, that is, to be part of the grammar of the language. As such, they are used unconsciously, automatically, and constantly. In general, grammaticized concepts are viewed as more fundamental than the concepts expressed by vocabulary items.
- Lakoff (1987), a pag.308

In the following list, the first property is characteristic of grammaticized concepts and the second is characteristic of ungrammaticized concepts: used vs. pondered automatic vs. controlled unconscious vs. conscious effortless vs. effortful fixed vs. novel conventional vs. personal. These “dimensions of grammaticization” are, of course, not independent of one another. Concepts that are automatic and unconscious are used in thinking and understanding; they are not merely pondered as objects of thought. Concepts that are used in this way are fixed in the mind, or “entrenched”, as opposed to being novel, that is, newly made up. Conventional concepts, shared by members of a culture, are also fixed in the mind of each speaker. Concepts that we ponder are, of course, conscious. [...] There are other dimensions of status that concepts may have that seem not to be involved in grammaticization: conceptual scaffolding vs. conceptual substance believed vs. not believed lived vs. merely used in understanding These distinctions are especially important for distinguishing among types of metaphorically defined concepts.
- Lakoff (1987), a pag.320-321

Whorf was right in observing that concepts that have been made part of the grammar are used in thought, not just as objects of thought, and that they are used spontaneously, automatically, unconsciously, end effortlessly. [...] I am convinced by Whorf’s arguments that the way we use concepts affects the way we understand experience; concepts that are spontaneous, automatic and unconscious are simply going to have a greater (though less obvious) impact on how we understand everyday life than concepts that we merely ponder. To me, conceptual systems are different if they lead consistently to different understandings of experience. Therefore, conceptual systems whose concepts are used differently are, to me, different systems
- Lakoff (1987), a pag.335