Citazioni |
 |
Basic-level concept are much more richly structured than kinesthetic image-schemas, which have only the grossest outlines of structure. - Lakoff (1987), a pag.270 basic-level concepts are not atomic building blocks without internal structure. The basic level is an intermediate level; it is neither the highest nor the lowest level of conceptual organization. - Lakoff (1987), a pag.270 Consider the concept of a MAN. It comes with a rich mental image, characterizing overall shape. But the mental image also comes with a schematic structure. [...]
In general, rich mental images are structured by image-schemas, but they are not exhaustively structured by them. The mental image is more than just the sum of the schemas. Since the mental image is part of what makes MAN a basic-level concept, the basic-level concept must contain schemas. If both basic-level concepts and image schemas are primitives, then we have the situation where one primitives contains other primitives. - Lakoff (1987), a pag.280 The studies of basic-level categorization suggest that our experience is preconceptually structured at that level. We have general capacities for dealing with part-whole structure in real world objects via gestalt perception, motor movement and the formation of rich mental images. These impose a preconceptual structure on our experience. Our basic-level concepts correspond to that preconceptual structure and are understood directly in terms of it. Basic-level concept are much more richly structured than kinesthetic image-schemas, which have only the grossest outlines of structure. Gestalts for general overall shapes (e.g., the shape of an elephant or a giraffe or a rose) are relatively rich in structure. Still, they occur preconceptually as gestalts, and although one can identify internal structure in them, the wholes seem to be psychologically more basic than the parts. In short, the idea that all internal structure is of a building block sort, with primitives and principles of combination, does not seem to work at the basic level of human experience. At this level, “basic” does not mean “primitive”; that is, basic-level concepts are not atomic building blocks without internal structure. The basic level is an intermediate level; it is neither the highest nor the lowest level of conceptual organization. - Lakoff (1987), a pag.269-270 Basic-level concepts [...] have a gestalt structure, defined by in part by images and motor movements. - Lakoff (1987), a pag.284 Basic-level and image-schematic concepts [...] are directly meaningful, since they put us in touch with preconceptual structures in our bodily experience of functioning in the world. It is because the body is in the mind, as Johnson puts it, that our basic-level and image-schematic concepts are meaningful. - Lakoff (1987), a pag.292 The existence of directly meaningful concepts-basic-level concepts and image schemas- provides certain fixed points in the objective evaluation of situations. The image-schematic structuring of bodily experience is, we hypothesize, the same for all human beings. Moreover, the principles determining basic-level structure are also universally valid. - Lakoff (1987), a pag.302 Basic-level concepts are directly meaningful because they reflect the structure of our perceptual-motor experience and our capacity to form rich mental images. - Lakoff (1987), a pag.372
|